“Taqasee” investigation: The deal between the United States and Egypt is an attempt to control the Chinese HQ-9B air defense system

The multi-billion dollar arms sales to Egypt in 2025, which are topped by the $4.67 billion NASAMS air defense system, serve a dual purpose for the United States and Egypt. Publicly, the sales are aimed at enhancing Egypt’s capability to counter evolving regional air threats like drones and cruise missiles, thereby supporting the security of a key non-NATO ally. However, beneath the surface, the deal is a major strategic maneuver by the United States to increase its influence and counter the growing military-technical relationships that Egypt has been cultivating with America’s rivals, especially China and Russia.

For Egypt, this massive spending, which is occurring amid significant economic pressure and IMF oversight, shows a prioritization of national security and regime stability over immediate economic relief. It is also being used as a diplomatic tool by Cairo to appease U.S. concerns about its foreign policy diversification. While the United States asserts that the deal will not disrupt the regional military balance, it strategically strengthens Egypt’s defensive posture without challenging Israel’s qualitative military edge, a cornerstone of U.S. regional policy. This raises a number of questions about this deal.

1- What regional threats does the NASAMS system address?

The NASAMS system is a medium to long-range system adept at neutralizing threats like aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial systems (drones). The inclusion of advanced missiles such as the AMRAAM-ER and the AIM-9X Sidewinder Block II provides a layered defense against fast, maneuverable, and stealthy targets.

These acquisitions address gaps in Egypt’s current air defense network, which is a mix of Soviet, Chinese, Russian, and locally made systems. The stated goal is to improve Egypt’s ability to defend itself against “regional malicious actors” and enhance interoperability with U.S. forces, thereby contributing to regional stability.

2- Beyond the stated goals, what are the implicit strategic benefits for the United States in approving this deal now, especially regarding Egypt’s military relations with Russia and China?

The strategic benefits for the United States are significant and directly tied to countering the influence of its global rivals. The deal is seen as a move to strengthen ties with a crucial non-NATO ally at a time when Cairo has been actively diversifying its military suppliers. Between 2016 and 2021, Russia reportedly surpassed the U.S. as the largest arms exporter to Egypt. More recently, Egypt’s growing military relations with China, highlighted by a joint air maneuver and the acquisition of the Chinese HQ-9B air defense system, have raised concerns in Washington.

By approving the sale of the highly capable NASAMS system—a system Egypt has sought for years—the U.S. aims to maintain its influence, reinforce interoperability with its own systems, and deter deeper Egyptian reliance on Russian and Chinese military technology. This deal helps solidify the U.S.’s role as Egypt’s essential security partner.

3- What are the potential ramifications of this deal on the regional balance of power, specifically concerning Israel and other Gulf countries?

The United States has repeatedly stated that arms sales to Egypt will not alter the fundamental military balance in the region. This is a crucial component of U.S. policy, which is legally and strategically committed to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME).

For Gulf countries, the deal reinforces the U.S. commitment to the security of its regional partners. With several Gulf nations also integrating Israeli defense technology into their security frameworks to counter common threats, the deal supports the long-standing peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, which is a cornerstone of U.S. diplomacy in the region.

The Geopolitics of the U.S. System Sale

“Taqasee” has analyzed the list of recent new buyers of the NASAMS system, which provides a context that reveals important dimensions of the arms deal with Egypt, shifting the context of the deal from equipment details to the geopolitics of the sale.

The list of buyers highlights the system’s primary role in U.S. foreign policy: arming allies and partners against threats posed by Russia and China. Ukraine uses NASAMS directly against Russian missiles and drones, making it a battle-tested system against Russian technology. Taiwan is acquiring it specifically to deter a potential conflict with China.

This pattern strongly supports the previous analysis that the U.S. motive for the Egypt deal is not just generic “regional threats,” but a strategic move to more closely tie Egypt to the Western security orbit and counter the influence of Russia and China, from whom Egypt has previously purchased weapons. By providing this specific system, the U.S. is equipping a key partner with a tool explicitly proven effective against its primary global rivals.

Egypt is not buying a common or second-rate system; it is acquiring one of the most sought-after and modern air defense systems in the Western arsenal. The buyers are almost exclusively NATO members (Netherlands, Norway, Lithuania, Hungary) or key strategic partners facing imminent threats, which indicates that NASAMS is the current standard for modernizing air defenses.

We also observed a backlog in production orders, which is causing a delay in delivery to Taiwan until late 2025. This high demand confirms that securing a $4.7 billion deal for such a high-demand system for Egypt indicates that the U.S. is giving this deal significant strategic priority.

Events Preceding the Deal

From late 2023 through 2024 and 2025, the Houthis launched a relentless campaign of drone and missile attacks against Israel-bound shipping in the Red Sea. These attacks, launched in solidarity with Gaza, disrupted global trade and exposed the vulnerability of this critical maritime corridor, which leads directly to the Suez Canal.

The Houthi campaign provided proof of how non-state actors using relatively cheap drones and missiles could threaten Egypt’s core economic and security interests. Consequently, acquiring an advanced air defense system like NASAMS is a direct response to protect the entrances of the Suez Canal and Egypt’s Red Sea coast from the very types of threats that have proven to be active and effective.

More recently, and returning to China-Egypt relations topic, the months leading up to the U.S. deal saw an unprecedented escalation in Egyptian military cooperation with China. In May 2025, Egypt and China concluded their first-ever joint air maneuver, dubbed “Eagles of Civilization 2025,” which included advanced Chinese J-10C fighter jets flying in Egyptian skies.

At the same time, reports emerged that Egypt had deployed the Chinese HQ-9B air defense system, a direct competitor to Western systems like NASAMS. This was a culmination of a “golden decade” of China-Egypt relations, which also saw Egypt join the BRICS bloc with strong support from Beijing and Moscow.

The Strategy of Containing China from Within the Egyptian Military

By selling NASAMS, a networked system equipped with advanced Sentinel radars designed for integration, the U.S. is providing the technological “brain” for Egypt’s most critical air defense layer. NASAMS is designed to be the central node, integrating various sensors and launch platforms.

By providing this core system, the U.S. ensures that the command, control, and data fusion for Egypt’s most important air defenses remain tied to American architecture. This effectively relegates the Chinese HQ-9B system to a standalone or secondary role, preventing it from becoming the central nervous system of the Egyptian defense network. Thus, an analysis of this data shows that the U.S. goal is to limit the spread and influence of Chinese technology within the Egyptian military itself, creating a U.S.-controlled digital ecosystem with the Chinese system operating alongside it, but not in charge of it.

Furthermore, an advanced, integrated system like NASAMS requires continuous software updates, specialized training, and logistical support from the manufacturer and the U.S. government. Unlike buying a “ready-made” tank, operating NASAMS effectively creates a deep and lasting dependency on the U.S. for the next two or three decades, as the system’s effectiveness relies on a continuous flow of American support.

Consequently, if Egypt were to drift too far toward a U.S. adversary in the future, Washington would have immense leverage through its control over the software, spare parts, and technical support that keeps Egypt’s primary air defense shield operational. This essentially reflects Egypt’s recent move to link its most critical defense capability to a long-term dependency relationship with the U.S.

The integration of the Chinese HQ-9B system into Egypt’s air defense network alongside the American NASAMS system does not represent a partnership of equals. Based on the established military doctrine and design philosophies inherent in both systems, the only effective way to create a unified network is to subordinate the HQ-9B, relegating it to a “sensor-launcher” role that is directed by the command and control “brain” of the NASAMS system.

This is not achieved by “hacking” the Chinese system, but by creating a hierarchical command structure where the HQ-9B feeds its data upward to the NASAMS Fire Distribution Center (FDC) and receives engagement orders downward. This structure ensures that the network’s underlying logic and operational doctrine remain compliant with the U.S.

The “Fire Distribution Center” Hierarchy

Modern air defense relies on creating a “system of systems,” an integrated network where various assets work in harmony. This is essential to prevent “friendly fire,” manage engagement priorities, and provide commanders with a unified picture of the airspace. This network requires a strict hierarchy with a single nerve center—a “C4I hub” (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence)—to arbitrate data conflicts and efficiently allocate weapons.

Given the United States’ role as Egypt’s primary strategic partner and the advanced networking capabilities of NASAMS, the U.S. system is the only choice for this central C4I role. The most impactful role of NASAMS lies in its Fire Distribution Center (FDC). It’s more than just a radar controller; it’s a sophisticated battle management hub.

Looking at the technical details of the system, the NASAMS design features an open architecture to integrate a wide range of sensors and effectors (missile launchers). This is its key advantage in a mixed-asset environment. The FDC is built around NATO-standard data links, serving as a secure and jam-resistant tactical data link that allows for real-time sharing of a Single Integrated Air Picture” (SIAP) among various allied air, land, and sea assets.

The FDC software is also designed to fuse data from multiple disparate radars into a single, cohesive track file and recommend the most effective weapon to engage each threat, a process known as “sensor fusion”.

The HQ-9B’s closed architecture and non-NATO-compliant design mean it cannot be the central hub in a mixed U.S.-Chinese system. However, the HQ-9B’s powerful Type 305A AESA radar provides long-range surveillance (hundreds of kilometers) that can significantly extend the visibility of the entire network, and its missiles offer a long-range, high-altitude intercept capability that complements the medium-range of NASAMS missiles.

In an integrated network, the HQ-9B would be treated as a subordinate “battery.” Its job is to use its powerful radar “eyes” and long-range missile “arms” when directed to do so by the central command—the NASAMS FDC.

Interlinking the Systems and Implementation Method

Creating this hierarchy requires building a technical and procedural bridge between two systems that were never designed to communicate with each other.

Step One: The Data Link Gateway
The HQ-9B system does not use “Link 16” but rather its own proprietary Chinese data links. Therefore, Egypt cannot simply connect the two systems directly. It must develop or acquire a “data link gateway.” This is a piece of hardware and software that acts as a translator:

  1. It receives raw radar tracking data from the HQ-9B command vehicle.
  2. It translates this data into a format the NASAMS Fire Distribution Center (FDC) can understand (e.g., Link 16 J-series message format).
  3. It then sends this translated data to the NASAMS FDC.

Step Two: One-Way Up, One-Way Down Data Flow
To maintain security and avoid compromising the systems, the data flow will be strictly managed:

  • Upward Data Flow (from HQ-9B to NASAMS): The HQ-9B will only send its sensor output—identified target tracks with location, altitude, speed, and direction. It will not send its sensitive internal operational data, such as its specific radar frequencies, waveforms, or missile guidance secrets, as this would require hacking the Chinese system.
  • Downward Data Flow (from NASAMS to HQ-9B): The NASAMS FDC will send specific, authorized commands, such as “Engage Target A,” “Cease Fire,” or “Provide updated tracking data on Target B.”

CISMOA Agreement and the Egyptian Military’s Dependence on the U.S.

This deal falls under the provisions of the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), an essential and non-negotiable prerequisite for the transfer of the sensitive technology integrated into the NASAMS system. This agreement obligates the recipient nation (Egypt) to a strict set of security protocols to protect sensitive U.S. communications technology and ensure interoperability related to system security and access control.

Under this agreement, Egypt is legally bound to prevent unauthorized third-party nationals (crucially, this means Russia and China) from accessing, inspecting, or attempting to reverse-engineer the technology. The technology can only be used for its intended purpose, and Egypt is responsible for its security and accountability.

In return, the U.S. government reserves the right to conduct periodic inspections, known as End-Use Monitoring (EUM), to verify Egypt’s compliance with all security protocols.

Additionally, the system uses Mode 5 IFF (Identification Friend or Foe)—an advanced IFF system—to securely identify friendly aircraft and prevent friendly fire. The transfer of this requires a security agreement. The radios and data processors within the system also use encryption to protect their communications from eavesdropping and jamming.

Thus, the Egyptian NASAMS deal is a maneuver that uses technological dependence and the engineering of alliances as a direct weapon. It exploits Egypt’s security concerns to significantly counter China’s growing influence in the Middle East, inflicting substantial damage on Beijing’s strategic, commercial, and intelligence ambitions.

If the HQ-9B system had become the central node of Egypt’s air defense, China would have gained an invaluable intelligence foothold. It would have gained deep insight into the operational patterns, electronic warfare environment, and tactical procedures of a major U.S.-trained military, namely the Egyptian army.

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